Standing Orders 2026: Parliament is treating symptoms, not democratic dysfunction

The last Parliament has agreed the next Parliament’s rules. Anna Curnow and Simon Wright reflect on what influence Trust Democracy’s submission made and the likely impact of the changes.

By Anna Curnow and Simon Wright

Parliament has just finished its three-yearly review of its own rules, the Standing Orders. The House has adopted the Standing Orders Committee’s report, and the changes take effect when the next Parliament meets after the 7 November election.

Trust Democracy made detailed submissions to the 2022 and 2025 reviews.  This article provides an overview of how much of our 2025 submission landed. We’ll also cover a more important question that wasn’t asked in the review: why are so many New Zealanders now trying to be heard through the select committee submission process? The Standing Orders review is a useful case study that reveals how the health of our democracy is being tested.

The problem Parliament identified

The Standing Orders Committee’s report is frank about the strain on select committees.

  • Volume. Nearly 1.4 million submissions have been made on bills over the last 30 years, and half of them arrived in the current Parliament alone. In 2014–17, only 6 bills drew more than 1,000 submissions. This term, 39 did. The Treaty Principles Bill alone drew more than 300,000, roughly triple the previous record.
  • Overload. The committee concluded that this high volume of submissions “exceeding members’ capacity to give them meaningful consideration”, and “risk drowning out considered and informative submissions”.
  • AI. Departments and Parliamentary staff are increasingly using digital tools, including AI, to summarise submissions. The committee wants this disclosed and highlights that people, not machines, should remain engaged with public feedback.
  • Pressure on scrutiny. Urgency was the most prominent theme in public submissions to the review. Shortened process deadlines have become “even more prevalent”, and their reasons “have not always been clear”.

It’s clear that Parliament’s main channel for public participation between elections is under strain.

Trust Democracy’s submission

Our submission started from the simple premise that Parliament “cannot be complacent” about public trust. We pointed to a 2024 Ipsos poll in which more than half of New Zealanders said the country was in decline, and to 2025 Edelman data showing trust in government in New Zealand Aotearoa to be below the global average. While New Zealand Aotearoa scores highly on electoral integrity it also scores poorly on participation, which the OECD identifies as central to rebuilding trust.

We argued that select committee scrutiny is weakened by four things: public engagement happens too late, hearings are formal and quasi-judicial which is off-putting to many, analysis is under-resourced, and key information can be hard to find. We made 14 recommendations, grouped around five key ideas:

  1. Better information, sooner. Provide links to Bill of Rights vetting reports, Regulatory Impact Statements, Departmental Disclosure Statements and Cabinet papers from bill pages. Publish submissions at least 24 hours before hearings, and departmental reports at least three weeks before report-back.
  1. Trustworthy analysis. Have Parliament’s own analysts, not officials from the sponsoring department, analyse submissions. Record and transcribe committee hearings as official Hansard.
  1. Better use of time. Let committee staff recommend longer speaking slots for submitters with real expertise, and give mass campaigns a separate channel to register views.
  1. Better ways to participate. Enable citizens’ assemblies and collaborative methods, take committees around the country, fund participation through a contestable fund, open Parliament’s own budget bids to public input, and make more use of committee inquiries and exposure drafts to engage the public earlier.
  1. Structural reform. Hold a public inquiry into increasing the number of MPs, and give Parliament and the public a real role in international treaty-making, from having input into government’s negotiating mandates to co-creation of a National Interest Analysis.

What Parliament changed

Measured recommendation by recommendation, the result is modest. By our assessment, none of our 14 recommendations was adopted in full, five or six were reflected in part, and the rest were not taken up. For a detailed analysis, see Appendix 1.

However, this understates our influence. The Committee’s report wrestles with almost exactly the problems we raised: mass submissions, overloaded committees, experts crowded out, AI-assisted analysis and the quality of scrutiny.

Our most significant result is not on the list at all. The new purpose statement for select committee consideration of bills (Amendment 9) echoes our argument that the quality of legislation should be central, that repetitive mass submissions create real problems, and that participation should be meaningful rather than performative. While the Committee appears to echo our diagnosis, it was much more cautious about the cure.

What Parliament didn’t ask

The report treats the flood of submissions as a capacity problem: too many to read, too little time to hear them. Its answers seek to address capacity challenges; prioritise the most useful submitters; use AI carefully; and accept, in the Committee’s words, that the process “is not designed to function as a straw poll”.

However, this approach does not address why around 700,000 submissions on bills arrived in a single Parliamentary term.

There are two ways to read that number. The optimistic reading is that New Zealanders are more engaged than ever, helped by online tools that make submitting easy. That is certainly part of the picture.

The other reading is more challenging. More than during any other term of term of Parliament, a submission to a select committee has often been the first and only formal opportunity the public gets to influence a law. People who feel they have little or no say early in a process may well be more motivated to express their views, both broad and specific, through the one opportunity that is open to them. Many are not there to fine-tune details. They are there to support or oppose, because this is the only opportunity to do so. And unfortunately, this is almost always too late to influence overall direction.

Read that way, the surge in submissions is not only a sign of a healthy democracy with high levels of engagement. It is a sign that public influence comes too late and reflects frustration rather than inclusion. If that is the cause, the Committee’s remedy carries a risk. Elevating legislative quality above being “informed of public views” makes sense for improving bills, and it reflects our own critique of mass submissions. But it risks making it easier to justify hearing fewer people, without addressing the lack of opportunity to provide feedback earlier in the process.

A deeper democratic problem

We feel that the pressure on select committees is a symptom with four underlying conditions contributing to it.

Coalition governance. Under MMP, much of the policy agenda is set in coalition agreements negotiated privately after an election. Those agreements can commit a government to specific bills before any public process begins. Select committees then become the place where the public meets decisions that were, in practice, made months earlier, at worst behind closed doors or, at best, based on often broad references made during the election campaign. That is not a criticism of any party. It is a structural feature of how we now govern, and how our participation processes have failed to adapt.

Declining trust. The evidence in our submission points to more than half of New Zealanders feeling the country is in decline, and trust in government sits below the global average. When people doubt that their views will change anything, they are more likely to treat a submission as a protest rather than a contribution to a better law.

Too little upstream engagement. The best time to shape a law is before it is written, when the problem is being defined and options are still open. New Zealand has few routine mechanisms for that at central government level. Exposure drafts are rare. Select committee inquiries are underused. Consultation by departments varies widely in quality and is often invisible to the public.

Limited influence before introduction. Even when people do engage early, it is rarely clear whether their input made any difference. Influence that cannot be seen does little to build trust.

Urgency compounds all four of these underlying conditions. When the stages for passing a law are shortened or skipped, the one remaining door for public input narrows further. The new requirement for Ministers to explain themselves (Amendment 18) is welcome. But it changes how decisions are justified, not whether they are made.

What comes next

If the problem is that opportunities for public influence arrive too late, the answer is to open more doors earlier. Trust Democracy’s submission referred to a number:

  • Citizens’ assemblies. Randomly selected, demographically representative groups of New Zealanders, given time, evidence and expert support to deliberate on a hard question. They have been used in many places around the world on topics as contentious as abortion, marriage equality, biodiversity, climate adaptation, corruption in government and electoral reform. They give Parliament considered public judgement, not just raw opinion.
  • Deliberative processes inside Parliament. Select committees can run inquiries before legislation is drafted and commission deliberative processes on contested bills. Tools such as Polis can map where the public actually agrees, rather than counting simply yes and no.
  • Participation before decisions are locked in. Governments can publish exposure drafts, consult on options rather than finished proposals, and show how public input changed the result.

The Committee has given us an opening. It notes that since 2020 there has been “very little use” of alternative engagement, and it urges committees to try. The new Parliament will establish its practices in its first months. Trust Democracy will continue to make the case, to new select committees and to the incoming Government, for increased transparency and inclusive practices earlier in the process.

The Standing Orders review asked how Parliament can cope with the number of people trying to be heard. Trust Democracy suggests that the question for the next three years is how to give New Zealanders a real say before they feel they have to shout.

Sources

Appendix 1 – Analysis of the level of uptake for each of Trust Democracy’s 2025 submission

Our recommendationWhat the Committee didOutcome
1. Link key government documents from bill pagesNo changeNot adopted
2. Publish submissions 24 hours before hearingsNo changeNot adopted
3. Longer speaking time for expert submittersNew purpose statement asks committees to prioritise expertise and lived experience and hold sustained conversations with key submitters; experts should get more timePartly, in principle
4. Transcribe hearings as HansardNot for ordinary hearings. Only the new Legislative Scrutiny Committee’s public sessions will be transcribedNot adopted
5. Parliamentary analysts instead of departmental officialsConflict of interest acknowledged; current model defended, with stronger expectations of good faith and disclosureRejected
6. Publish departmental reports three weeks before report-backNo changeNot adopted
7. Enable citizens’ assemblies and new engagementCommittees again urged to try surveys, online tools and informal hearings; no endorsement of citizens’ assembliesPartly
8. Committees to go to the peopleFlexible, less formal hearings encouragedPartly reflected
9. Contestable participation fundNo changeNot adopted
10. Public input on Parliament’s budget bidsNo changeNot adopted
11. Earlier public involvementMinisters must now explain skipping or shortening select committee (Amendment 18)Partly
12. Inquiry into the number of MPsNo changeNot adopted
13–14. Public role in treaty-makingParliamentary treaty scrutiny strengthened; executive’s negotiating role untouchedPartly

AI Statement: AI was used to support researching and early drafting of this article. However, several human editing processes completed the process to ensure the contents are accurate and reflect Trust Democracy’s views.

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